Politics in Venezuela (circa January 2009)

November 2008, Regional Elections

Late last year Venezuelans once again turned up to vote for and against a series of potent symbols: ‘21st Century Socialism’, the ‘Bolivarian Revolution’, and the most impressive of all current political tokens in Venezuela and possibly across Latin America, Hugo Chávez. The elections on 23 November 2008 weren’t presidential elections—these were held just over two years ago—but rather local and regional elections. And we are now once more preparing for a referendum to be held in mid February, a vote on a constitutional amendment that will decide whether Chavez can seek re-election once his current term ends in 2012. 

At the outset of the three-month long campaign for state governors and local mayors—an election that would decide the fate of over 600 officials and their governed—Chavez had strategically done all he could to transform the gubernatorial and mayoral elections into a national plebiscite on himself, the revolution and his leadership. The end result being clear, the polarisation of the vote, thus setting up, once again, a basically dichotomous political identification for voters. Venezuelans would have to either affirm Chavez as the Comandante de la revolución or vote against his party’s chosen candidates. In this way Chávez displaced attention from many of the not so remarkable local and regional candidates whose competence could easily be questioned even by the most ardent Chavez supporters. Most of the polls taken during the campaign, asking Venezuelans to identify their concerns, would consistently rank violent crime (inseguridad), rubbish on the streets and the perceived incompetence of the public sector among their major concerns. It was equally clear that Opposition voters would vote against Chavez’s candidates, and the various parties of the opposition did remarkably well in proposing single candidates for most positions. Venezuelans would thus once again be forced to vote for Chávez and the Bolivarian Revolution or the Opposition coalition and its unclear alternative. 

Once the electoral event had concluded, Chávez’s newly created United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) had indeed won a great number of state governments and the greatest number of local councils or municipalities. The figures read as follow: over 65% of registered voters turned up, together deciding that the PSUV should control 17 of the 22 states and over 80% of the country’s municipalities, that is, 258 from a total of 326. The Opposition, on the other hand, picked up a couple of key states: Miranda, Zulia and Carabobo. Not only the most urbanised and populated of all 22 states, but each one an important symbol in a politically divided landscape. The state of Miranda, the wealthiest by far, and where half of Caracas is to be found, went to a leading figure of the Opposition. The Western most state of Venezuela, Zulia, traditionally known as the country’s petrol state, where much of the country’s wealth is still produced, opted for Opposition figures whose hostility to anything that reeks of Leftism is well known. The third state, Carabobo, a mere 2 hours West of Caracas, and the country’s most industrialised region was retuned to the Opposition after 4 years with a former Chávez ally. Finally, the opposition also picked up the largest mayorship of Venezuela, the capital city itself.

The case of Caracas is an interesting one. Many observers were surprised by the triumph of the passionately anti-Chavista Antonio Ledezma. Metropolitan Caracas is itself a grouping of six municipalities, five of which were won by opposition candidates. Ledezma, a seasoned politician and one the city’s former mayors was well received by Caraqueños, winning over an equally experienced politician and one of Chavez’s most liked followers, Aristóbulo Istúriz. A politician who, like Chávez, speaks the language of the underprivileged and poorer classes, who served Chávez as Minister of Education for a couple of years, and whom like Ledezma, had also been a former Mayor of Caracas prior to the Bolivarian Revolution.

Chávez’s ceaseless campaigning for his candidates all over the country was very much meant to make it clear to supporters that they should repay loyalty to himself and chastise defection. In states such as Barinas, Carabobo and Guárico a couple of candidates with popular support but who had not been chosen to run on the PSUV ticket, defected from Chavez’ party, running independently or with the pro-Chavez Communist Party and the Fatherland for All Party (PPT). In various campaign speeches Chavez declared these parties to be counterrevolutionary as they opposed the decision of the leading party of the revolution, Chavez’s own, and would inevitably divide the vote.

Hours after the elections and shortly after the results were broadcast on television well past midnight; Chávez spoke and was simulcast over all free-to-air channels, declaring that that continuation of the revolution without his leadership had been put to one side. Clearly referring to the defections within the pro-Chávez Left and the wish of parties such as the Communist Party and the PPT to strike a balance between their support of the Revolution and their obsequiousness to Chávez himself. In the early hours of the morning while addressing the nation, he proudly stated that “Chavismo without Chávez” had been defeated and that all those who had wished for such an apostasy would have to retract or reconsider their loyalties.

In a recent article Gonzalo Gómez, one of the founders of Aporrea.org—the main pro-Chávez news and opinion website, similar in kind to Indynews—an editor of Marea Socialista and an important member of the PSUV, wrote that there was “a new battle” in store, “this time for the constitutional amendment to allow the crucial permanence of the leadership of the revolution”. Gómez is of course not referring to a general leadership but to the sole leadership of Chávez as president of the nation and Comandante de la revolución.

It is evident to me that there is a divide between what Chávez supporters would like his government to stand for and what has been achieved. Chávez himself is a remarkable politician with high approval ratings, and bucketloads of charisma. It is common to hear people jokingly say that they can’t bear listen to Chávez as they are certain that he would manage to convince them once more. Nevertheless, after 10 years in government there are some very basic issues that many Venezuelans would have liked the Government to have done more about. The basics: crime or as Venezuelans say in a rather phenomenological tone: “insecurity”; the perceived inefficacy of the public sector normally voiced in terms of people’s belief in the ascendancy of corruption among the new political classes, and greater participation in decision making.

In the same article Gómez deflects criticism of the government by stating that the “social layer that administers the [Venezuelan] state is still bourgeois, it carries the burdens of the past and is constantly exposed to the corrosiveness of bureaucracy and corruption” (Gonzalo Gómez, “Venezuela 2008: balance del proceso revolucionario” in Marea Socialista, 15). As in many such articles, we are told that after 10 years of government and revolution, accusations against the government are misdirected, given that it is the past that is responsible for present misdeeds, whatever these may be. There is great hesitation to discuss such issues and hold the government or Chávez himself responsible. And Chávez’ strategy of consistently being on campaign disallows such critique, which perhaps require a greater degree of normalisation in politics.In the same vein, I am often made uncomfortable by the ease with which proponents of the revolution are content to invoke teleological arguments or to present imagery of a future that seems unattainable given the actual conditions. And above all the straightforward manner in which future progress and the continuation of the revolution itself are equated with Chávez’s permanence in government rather than to a greater need to discuss, articulate Left critiques and hold those in government responsible for oversights and mistakes. Referring to the new campaign already underway for the constitutional amendment in mid February, in the same article cited above Gómez writes:

“This battle can only have meaning if it is to redouble the fight against bureaucracy and corruption; if we advance the measures for the transition to socialism; if we complete the agrarian revolution; if we assume the control of state finances, technology and foreign trade; if we prioritize the social debt and stop paying the corrupt foreign debt; if we establish worker and community control over the means of production […]; if we build a public communications system in the hands of workers and communities as a form of People’s Power; if we establish communal governorships and give way to national bodies for workers and people’s government; if we underpin the unity of all peoples in revolution”.

The question is simple. Given the clear fact that Chávez still has 4 years to go in office—he was re-elected in December 2006—why is it necessary to stall the revolutionary process by demanding that Chávez be the sole conduit.

The revolution has indeed moved forward and certainly merits our interest and support, but the lack of critical voices within Chavismo and Chávez’s willingness to obliterate dissent on the Left is a serious obstacle for the deepening of the revolutionary process. Supporters will claim that Chávez has on repeated occasions called for debate and invited critics to dialogue, though it is, to all intents and purposes, a seriously conditioned debate where the terms are more often than not set from the top.

The current argument that is being spun by supporters and by el Comandante himself, whereby the continuation of the revolution is understood to essentially depend on his permanence in the top post, though clearly a realist position and true in the short term, is, in the long term, devastating for the Socialist project itself.

Yet some facts speak louder than others. On the whole there has been a reduction of social inequality and just about every Venezuelan is willing to defend in some manner the benefit programs or “social missions” that the government has run since overcoming the 2002 coup. The recent statistics offered to us by the Venezuelan National Institute for Statistics and corroborated by the CEPAL—the United Nations affiliated Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean—have, for example, shown a reduction in the GINI coefficient for economic inequality. The mark would be 1998, when Chávez came to power through procedurally democratic and fair elections. At the time, the coefficient stood at 0.48, which for 2006—the latest UN data available—stands at 0.41 (26-12-2008, “Disminuye el índice de desigualdad en Venezuela” ABN/Yvke). For those who don’t know, ‘1’ measures a hypothetical “perfect inequality” and ‘0’ an equally impossible though theoretically curious “perfect equality”. Not a staggering drop, certainly, though significant nonetheless. The equivalent to a redistribution of about 7% in the nation’s wealth from the top 20% wealthiest Venezuelans to those further below. For comparative purposes I’ll say that most European nations have GINI coefficients between 0.24 and 0.36. Likewise, Venezuela’s Human Development Index according to the UNDP is currently at about 0.826, having reached 0.8 in 2000, two years into Chávez’s first government (see the UNDP’s statistics at http://hdr.undp.org/en/mediacentre/news/title,15493,en.html). That is a 0.026 increase in 6 years. Australia’s HDI growth for the same period stands at 0.014, though the HDI itself reads 0.965, among the very highest in the world.

Nevertheless what is truly remarkable is the power that Chávez (or the Revolution) has at its disposal. The Bolivarian Revolution is real, though it is equally a highly virtual thing. Very much the stuff of a Jean Baudrillard. The slogans are real, though reminiscent of earlier struggles fought by Leftists that Chávez or the government claim as their predecessors. The revolution is real, though Venezuelans are forced to tune into any of the various state channels to see how the revolution is going. Chávez, as is well known, conducts a weekly program broadcast on Sundays, yet you can often catch him on TV on other state channels, talking endlessly about some up and coming political event, and very much performing the revolution for all his viewers, followers and opponents. In a country that can be quite dangerous, watching the revolution for a couple of hours on TV is perhaps the safer way to do this. But this mediates revolution and this way of doing politics in Venezuela is experienced by many as if in an endless electoral campaign. It may be that it is precisely this way of doing politics that appeals to the masses or is understood by the masses. I suspect that this may be the case, but the one-man-show aspect of the revolution is certainly reinforced in this way. And the question of Chávez’ continuing leadership becomes harder to pose.

The Revolution or Chávez—its unparalleled and unquestioned leader—has amassed a lot of power. To be honest, the whole Venezuelan State has been put to service this relatively peaceful revolution. Government building elevators play revolutionary muzak, or catchy tunes especially composed for the next battle, always electoral in character. On Sunday Chávez will try out a tune or two with the audience and a week or so later you can hear the same tune at any of the 30 something Metro Stations traversing much of Caracas.

Nevertheless, politics in Venezuela is clearly heading in a different direction to the standard Liberal Democratic melange. Politics in Venezuela are not a simple matter of electoral events. Denunciations and accusations that portray Venezuela as heading towards a Socialist haven, like Cuba but better, or, on the contrary, like Cuba but worse, are both unconvincing and fail to discuss the very necessary social reforms and political guarantees that are crucial for a political community to survive.

Furthermore, the interesting political experiment in Venezuela is not to be found in the dramatic, showy and recurrent electoral cycle. Albeit these elections remain important as they allow observers to comprehend that Chavez’s revolution accepts the constraints that are normally identified as the minimal guarantees of democracy and a republican system. Yet the real political experiment is to be found elsewhere, not simply in the spectacular support that the televised revolution performed daily by Chávez enjoys, but in the development and trial of a series of “mechanisms”, as Venezuelan like to say, for political participation across the country. The latest and best formulated of these has been the growth of the consejos comunales or Communal Councils.

There are over 20,000* Communal Councils across Venezuela, the newest and most important of the various experiences the revolution has promoted as instances of social participation and popular organisation. The Councils not only administer resources directly entrusted to it by the country’s executive, but also undertake and develop a raft of programs such as minor infrastructure projects, maintenance, and, increasingly, security. A recent addition, clearly a tricky policy as it both legitimises something that many poorer neighbourhoods had been doing anyway and creates a situation whereby the administration of justice may be somewhat diffused. Also, the Councils receive funds through Communal Banks, each bank financing the projects of a number of Councils.

The Communal Councils represent the greatest challenge on behalf of the revolution to the traditional state and its governance. As of 2007, Communal Councils are directly funded by petrol revenues, the embedding of funding in hydrocarbons law is especially important in a country where much of the state is itself funded by oil revenues, half of which had previously been directed to the states and the municipalities, and which are now transferred directly to the Communal Banks (see www.mps.gob.ve/index.php?option=com_remository&Itemid=65&func=fileinfo&id=8). The unfortunate reality is that Communal Councils have been thoroughly politicised and Chávez has to a great extent allowed this, or rather, encouraged this. The recent transfer of resources to the Communal Banks, totalling over 140 million US dollars a fortnight prior to the regional and local elections is a case in point.

February 2009, Constitutional Amendment

As Rory Carroll from the Guardian has put it, the Venezuelan revolution is “Latin America's leading leftist experiment”, though I guess that doesn’t mean one has to like it, which is certainly Carroll’s position. Nevertheless, the depth of the experiment and the difficulties that the country presents to its master planner abound.

Chávez and the Revolution will most likely win the up and coming constitutional amendment. At core, what is at stake with the amendment is the issue of Chávez’s being able to stand once more in 2012. I am certain that Venezuelans will continue to vote for Chávez if they can do so constitutionally, and as things stand, the revolution and the many slogans and symbols that try to define it will continue to depend fundamentally on Chávez’s remaining in office. 

*There are over 34,000 consejos comunales in Venezuela as of July 2010.

Caracas, 8 January 2009 — This was originally part of a longer article planned for an Australian Left politics and current affairs journal. At the time events seemed to just to keep on coming and the conclusion to the snapshot I was trying to present—if such a thing as a snapshot can be concluded—was nowhere in sight. Now that we are once again in true campaign mode in Venezuela, given that National Assembly elections are coming on 26 September, the article seemed reasonable enough and relevant in order to appreciate what is about to take place.